Iran Said It Might Talk to the US About Its Nuclear Plans: The 2025 Offer, the Red Line Behind It and Iran’s Nuclear Programme Explained
In March 2025 Iran said it would consider talks about fears that its nuclear programme could be turned to weapons, but never about dismantling it. That one distinction shaped everything that followed. This plain-English guide explains the offer, how the programme works and why the two sides could not agree.
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⚡ The short answer
On 9 March 2025, a day after its supreme leader had rejected talks with a “bullying” United States, Iran’s mission to the United Nations posted a more careful message. If the purpose of talks was to address concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme might be militarised, it said, that could be considered. If the purpose was to dismantle the programme, there would never be talks. In that sentence lay the whole dispute. Iran was willing to prove it was not building a bomb. It was not willing to give up enriching uranium. The United States came to demand exactly that. The talks that followed broke on this point, and two wars came after.
- ✅ The offer: 9 March 2025, from Iran’s UN mission
- ✅ Yes to talks about weapons fears; no to dismantling the programme
- ⚠️ The sticking point throughout: uranium enrichment on Iranian soil
- ⚠️ June 2025 and February 2026: military strikes; the question remains unsettled
The statement
The sequence over one weekend was this.
| Day | Event |
|---|---|
| Friday, 7 March 2025 | President Trump says he has written to Iran’s supreme leader proposing negotiations, and warns that the alternative is military |
| Saturday, 8 March | Ayatollah Khamenei tells officials that Iran will not negotiate with bullying governments, whose real aim is to impose demands on its missiles and its influence |
| Sunday, 9 March | Iran’s UN mission posts the two-part statement |
| Wednesday, 12 March | The letter is delivered in Tehran; the supreme leader repeats his refusal |
| Saturday, 12 April | Talks begin anyway, in Oman |
The UN mission’s message was only a few lines long. It was read around the world as a door left ajar, and it was. But the second half mattered as much as the first.
Iran offered to talk about what it might do with its nuclear programme. It refused to talk about whether it could have one. Washington heard the first half. Tehran meant the second.
“Militarisation” and “dismantlement”
These two words describe two entirely different negotiations.
| Talks about militarisation | Talks about dismantlement | |
|---|---|---|
| The question | How can the world be sure Iran is not building a bomb? | How does Iran give up the means to build one? |
| What Iran keeps | Its enrichment plants, under limits and inspection | Nothing that could enrich uranium |
| The model | The 2015 agreement | Libya in 2003, which gave up everything |
| Iran’s answer | Possible | Never |
| America’s position by mid-2025 | Not enough | Required |
Iranian officials had a particular reason to fear the second model. Libya’s leader surrendered his nuclear programme in 2003 and was overthrown and killed eight years later with the help of Western air power. In Tehran that story is told as a warning.
How a nuclear programme works
To follow the argument, a little science is needed. It is simpler than it sounds.
Uranium
Uranium dug from the ground is almost entirely of a kind that will not sustain a chain reaction. Less than one part in a hundred is the useful kind. Enrichment means raising that share.
| Level of enrichment | Used for |
|---|---|
| Under 1 per cent | Natural uranium; not usable as it is |
| 3 to 5 per cent | Fuel for ordinary power stations |
| 20 per cent | Research reactors that make medical isotopes |
| 60 per cent | No ordinary civilian use |
| About 90 per cent | Weapons |
Centrifuges
Enrichment is done in centrifuges: tall, thin cylinders that spin uranium gas at enormous speed. The heavier, useless kind drifts to the wall. The lighter, useful kind stays nearer the centre and is drawn off. One machine achieves very little. Thousands are linked in chains called cascades.
The awkward fact
The same machines make reactor fuel and bomb material. The only difference is how long you run them. And the work gets easier as it goes: getting from natural uranium to 20 per cent is most of the effort, and from 60 to 90 is a short final step.
That is why outsiders care so much about how many centrifuges Iran has, how good they are and how much enriched uranium it holds. Together these give the breakout time: how long it would take to make enough weapons-grade material for one bomb, if Iran decided to.
A bomb is more than its fuel
Having the material is not the same as having a weapon. A country must also design a device, build it, and make it small and tough enough to fit on a missile. American intelligence assessed for years that Iran had halted organised work on that part in 2003 and had not taken a decision to resume it. Israel disputed that assessment.
💡 Tip: who checks?
The International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body based in Vienna, inspects nuclear sites in countries that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its inspectors count centrifuges, weigh and seal containers of uranium and review camera footage. They can say how much material a country has declared and where it is. They cannot read intentions, and they can inspect only where they are allowed to go. When Iran stopped co-operating in mid-2025, the world lost its only direct view of the programme.
Seventy years in brief
| Period | What happened |
|---|---|
| 1957 | The United States, under its “Atoms for Peace” programme, helps Iran begin nuclear research |
| 1970 | Iran ratifies the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promising not to seek weapons |
| 1970s | The Shah plans a large fleet of power stations with Western firms |
| 1979 | The revolution; Western help ends |
| Late 1980s and 1990s | Iran obtains centrifuge designs and parts through an illicit network led by a Pakistani scientist |
| 2002 | An exiled opposition group reveals secret sites at Natanz and Arak |
| 2006 | The United Nations Security Council imposes the first sanctions |
| 2011 | The Bushehr power station, completed by Russia, starts up |
| 2013 | A new Iranian president opens negotiations |
| 2015 | The nuclear agreement is signed |
| 2018 | The United States withdraws from it |
| 2019 to 2024 | Iran exceeds the agreement’s limits step by step |
| 2025 and 2026 | Talks, strikes, more talks, war |
The 2015 agreement
The deal signed in Vienna in July 2015, between Iran and six world powers, is the reference point for everything since.
| Iran agreed to | For how long |
|---|---|
| Enrich only to 3.67 per cent | 15 years |
| Hold no more than about 300 kilograms of enriched uranium | 15 years |
| Cut its working centrifuges by about two-thirds | 10 years |
| Stop enriching at the underground Fordow site | 15 years |
| Rebuild a reactor so it could not make plutonium | Permanently |
| Accept the most intrusive inspections ever agreed | Up to 25 years |
In return, United Nations, American and European sanctions on its oil, banks and trade were lifted.
It was, in the terms of this article, a militarisation deal, not a dismantlement deal. Iran kept its plants and its knowledge. Its breakout time was pushed from a few weeks to about a year.
Its critics, in Israel, in the Gulf and among American Republicans, made three objections: the limits expired; it said nothing about missiles or about Iran’s allies across the region; and it gave Iran money. In May 2018 President Trump withdrew and restored sanctions.
Iran waited a year, then began to breach the limits one at a time. By 2025 it was enriching to 60 per cent and held, by the inspectors’ count, several hundred kilograms at that level: enough, if enriched further, for a number of weapons.
2025: the talks and the gap
When talks opened in Oman in April 2025, both sides at first spoke of something like 2015 again. An American envoy mentioned 3.67 per cent as a possible level.
Then Washington’s position hardened to zero enrichment. Iran could have nuclear power, American officials said, with fuel bought from abroad, as many countries do. It could not have centrifuges.
That was dismantlement. Iran had said in March it would never discuss it.
| Proposal floated | What it was | Why it failed |
|---|---|---|
| A return to low enrichment | Iran enriches to under 4 per cent under inspection | Washington moved away from it |
| Zero enrichment | Iran imports its fuel | Iran refused |
| A regional consortium | Enrichment by a group of countries, perhaps outside Iran | Iran insisted on some enrichment at home |
| A pause | Iran stops for a fixed period while talks continue | No agreement on length or price |
On 31 May the inspectors reported a record stock of highly enriched uranium. On 12 June their governing board declared Iran in breach of its obligations for the first time in twenty years. The next day Israel attacked.
The strikes
In June 2025 Israel, joined after nine days by the United States, bombed the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow and the complex at Isfahan. Fordow lies deep inside a mountain and was hit with the heaviest conventional bombs in existence.
What the strikes achieved is disputed. American leaders said the programme had been destroyed. Leaked assessments and outside experts suggested it had been set back by months or a few years. Nobody outside Iran could say where its stock of 60 per cent uranium was. Iran suspended co-operation with the inspectors, saying their reports had helped its attackers.
United Nations sanctions returned in September 2025.
In early 2026 talks resumed, and on 28 February a much larger war began, in which Iran’s leader was killed. A memorandum signed in June 2026 stopped the fighting for a few weeks. By every account available it left the nuclear question for later. When this article was written, later had not arrived.
⚠️ What bombing can and cannot do
Buildings and machines can be destroyed. Knowledge cannot. Iran has thousands of scientists and engineers who know how to build centrifuges, and it may still hold much of its enriched uranium. Many specialists argue that attacking a programme under inspection ended the inspections and gave Iran its strongest reason yet to want a weapon. Others reply that negotiation had been tried for twenty years and had brought Iran to the threshold. Both views are held by serious people. This article does not settle it.
Does Iran want a bomb?
The honest answer is that outsiders do not know.
Reasons to think not.
- Iran has said so consistently for decades.
- Its late supreme leader issued a religious ruling that nuclear weapons are forbidden.
- It stayed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepted inspections for most of that time.
- American intelligence assessed until 2025 that no decision to build had been taken.
Reasons for doubt.
- It hid major sites until they were exposed.
- It enriched to 60 per cent, for which it had no civilian need.
- Inspectors found traces of uranium at places Iran had not declared and received no convincing explanation.
- Its officials began to say openly that the country’s doctrine could change if it were attacked.
The most widely held view among analysts was that Iran wanted to be a threshold state: able to build a weapon quickly, without actually doing so. That gives much of the deterrent with less of the cost. It is also the position hardest to verify and easiest to misread.
The view from Pakistan
This subject is closer to home for Pakistanis than for most.
A neighbour with the bomb
Pakistan is one of nine countries with nuclear weapons, and the only Muslim-majority one. It tested in 1998, in reply to India. It never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was sanctioned for years, and then accepted.
Iranians notice the contrast. A country that stayed outside the treaty and built weapons is a recognised power. A country inside the treaty that built none was bombed.
An uncomfortable link
The centrifuge designs with which Iran’s programme began came, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, through an illicit network run by the metallurgist who led Pakistan’s own enrichment effort. He confessed on television in 2004 and was pardoned. The Pakistani state has always said he acted without its authority. The episode is one reason Pakistan treads carefully on anything touching Iran’s programme.
The official position
Pakistan’s stated policy has been steady:
- Iran, as a member of the treaty, has the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
- it should meet its obligations to the inspectors;
- the dispute should be settled by negotiation;
- attacks on nuclear facilities are dangerous and unlawful.
Pakistan condemned the strikes of 2025 and 2026. It then used its ties with both sides to host their negotiators in Islamabad in April 2026.
What Pakistan fears
- A nuclear-armed Iran would change the balance on its western border, though the two countries are not enemies.
- A shattered Iran would be worse: refugees, militancy in the shared Baloch borderlands and an end to cross-border trade.
- A precedent. If one country’s nuclear sites can be bombed, others’ can.
- The economy. War in the Gulf raised Pakistan’s fuel bill and its inflation.
How other countries settled the question
| Country | What it did | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| South Africa | Built six weapons, then dismantled them voluntarily around 1990 | Welcomed back into the world |
| Libya | Gave up its programme in 2003 | Its government was overthrown in 2011 |
| Iraq | Programme destroyed after the 1991 war; invaded in 2003 on false claims that it had been rebuilt | Occupation and civil war |
| North Korea | Left the treaty and tested in 2006 | Sanctioned, isolated, but not attacked |
| India and Pakistan | Never joined the treaty; tested in 1998 | Sanctioned briefly, then accepted |
| Iran | Stayed in the treaty; enriched to the threshold | Sanctioned, then bombed |
It is not hard to see what lesson a government might draw from that table. That is the deepest worry of those who work to stop the spread of nuclear weapons: that the events of 2025 and 2026 taught the wrong one.
✅ Key point
The short statement of 9 March 2025 said what Iran would and would not discuss: guarantees against a weapon, yes; giving up enrichment, no. Every later round of talks, in Muscat, Rome, Geneva and Islamabad, ran into that same line. Two wars have not moved it. Until one side changes its answer to that single question, or until someone finds wording both can live with, there will be ceasefires and memoranda, but no settlement.
Words used in this article
| Term | Plain meaning |
|---|---|
| Enrichment | Raising the share of the useful kind of uranium |
| Centrifuge | A spinning machine that enriches uranium gas |
| Breakout time | How long a country would need to make enough material for one weapon |
| Threshold state | A country able to build a weapon quickly that has not done so |
| Non-Proliferation Treaty | The 1970 treaty under which most countries promised not to seek nuclear weapons |
| IAEA | The United Nations body that inspects nuclear sites |
| Sanctions | Restrictions on trade and finance |
| Militarisation | Turning a civilian programme to weapons |
| Dismantlement | Taking a programme apart entirely |
| Isotope | One of the forms an element can take |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2015 | Nuclear agreement |
| 2018 | United States withdraws |
| 2021 | Iran begins enriching to 60 per cent |
| 7 March 2025 | President Trump reveals his letter |
| 9 March 2025 | Iran’s UN mission: talks on militarisation possible, on dismantlement never |
| 12 April 2025 | Talks begin in Oman |
| 12 June 2025 | Inspectors’ board finds Iran in breach |
| 13 to 24 June 2025 | Twelve-day war; nuclear sites bombed |
| 28 September 2025 | United Nations sanctions return |
| 28 February 2026 | A larger war begins |
| 11 and 12 April 2026 | Talks in Islamabad |
| 17 June 2026 | Memorandum signed; nuclear question deferred |
For Pakistan’s own decision-making on foreign policy, read our guide to Pakistan’s politics.
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Frequently asked questions
❓ What did Iran say about talks with the United States in March 2025?
On 9 March 2025 its mission to the United Nations said that talks to address concerns about the possible militarisation of its nuclear programme could be considered, but that talks aimed at dismantling the programme would never take place.
❓ What is the difference between militarisation and dismantlement?
Talks about militarisation concern guarantees that a civilian programme is not used for weapons. Dismantlement means giving up the programme, including enrichment, altogether.
❓ Does Iran have nuclear weapons?
No country or agency has said that it does. Iran says it does not seek them. It had, by 2025, enriched uranium to 60 per cent, close to weapons grade.
❓ What is uranium enrichment?
Increasing the share of the kind of uranium that can sustain a chain reaction. Power stations need about 4 per cent; a weapon needs about 90 per cent.
❓ What was the 2015 nuclear deal?
An agreement between Iran and six world powers that limited Iran’s enrichment and stockpile and allowed intrusive inspections, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United States withdrew from it in 2018.
❓ Why did the 2025 talks fail?
Mainly because the United States came to demand an end to all enrichment in Iran, which Iran refused.
❓ Were Iran’s nuclear sites destroyed?
They were bombed in June 2025 and again in 2026. How much damage was done, and what remains, is disputed.
❓ What is Pakistan’s position?
That Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear energy, should meet its obligations to inspectors, and that the dispute should be settled by talks. Pakistan condemned the strikes and later hosted negotiations.
❓ Is Pakistan a nuclear power?
Yes. It tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Sources
- SRN News, “Iran would consider talks with US about concerns over militarization of nuclear program, UN mission says” — an agency report, 9 March 2025.
- Report.az, “Iran may consider talks with US about concerns over militarization of nuclear program” — March 2025.
- The Financial Express (Bangladesh), “Iran open to talks with US” — March 2025.
- Wikipedia, “2025–2026 Iran–United States negotiations” — read in part; last edited 8 October 2026.
- Wikipedia, “Twelve-Day War” — opening read; last edited 27 September 2026.
- Wikipedia, “2026 Iran war” — read in part; last edited 8 October 2026.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA and Iran” — for the inspectors’ reports.
